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A bstract

Inflation has been defined by many great economists such as Milton Friedman as a
“monetary phenomenon.” Inflation can cause many adverse effects on the global
economy, and history has shown central bankers that through the control of inflation,
output will steadily increase over time without the risk of overheating. Inflation targeting
is a relatively new, yet controversial subject between central bankers, but over the past
twenty years, the framework has proven to be successful in countries like the United
States, United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Canada. This paper seeks to identify the roots
of inflation through an analysis of history, and the effects that inflation targeting has had
on the United States and the rest of the world. As the global economy becomes larger and
more connected, there is a need for monetary policy to grow equally reliable and
transparent. Throughout my research process, I have read multiple books and working
papers on the subject, as well as interviewed economists on the costs and benefits of
inflation targeting as a framework. I have found that inflation targeting, coupled with
other monetary tools provides an efficient method of conducting monetary policy, in
which the evidence in this paper supports on both an international and domestic
viewpoint. In short, inflation targeting creates accountability, transparency, and quicker
response times to unforeseen events, which all lead to a more efficient means of long
term, steady growth.
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Barsema 1

The fundamental question of targeting growth of the money supply, as central
bankers did in the 1970’s, or set inflation targets, as central bankers are now, is still very
much apparent in the global debate of monetary policy. Although Monetarists agree on
the same broad framework of focusing on interest rates to control output, they have
disagreed about this subject for decades. The question that the central bankers have
problems answering is which targeting method will lead to the most efficient and steady
growth of output, while keeping one’s currency relatively strong.
Since about 1990, a large number of industrialized nations have started to use
inflation targeting as their framework for monetary policy. In the Journal o f Economic
Perspectives, Ben Bemanke, the United States Federal Reserve Chairman, defines
inflation targeting as “the announcement of official target ranges for the inflation rate at
one or more horizons, and by the explicit acknowledgement that low and stable inflation
is the overriding goal” (Bemanke 97). The early adopters of inflation targeting include
New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Sweden, which have all seen substantial
turnarounds from their lagging economies in the 1980’s all the way through the mid1990’s by the use of inflation targeting.
This paper seeks to give a background on the inflation targeting framework,
address key issues in the debate between targeting the growth of the money supply or
inflation, give both the positives and the negatives of inflation targeting, as well as
evidence from practice on an international scale. It is important to note that the author is
not biased toward either framework, but yet seeks to identify the most efficient method of
sustaining long-term growth in the global economy.
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Inflation of the 1970’s and the Birth of Inflation Targeting:
As the Vietnam conflict was winding down, the 1970’s brought along a time of
rapid inflation to the rest of the world. In the 1960’s America enjoyed prolonged business
cycles which lead to great economic expansion. President Nixon, already faced with
politically troubled times, was not willing to sacrifice the extraordinary low
unemployment rate of 3.3% for lower inflation in wage growth. Arthur Bums, the Federal
Reserve Chairman appointed by Nixon in 1970, knew that the expansionary business
cycles would compound inflation, but had a hard time deviating from the President’s
wishes (Bartlett).
The political pressure mounted from the political defeat that Vice President Nixon
faced in the 1959-1960 election, where he blamed tight credit conditions and slow growth
created by the Federal Reserve for the loss of the election. Once Nixon appointed Bums
in 1970, the President called for loose credit conditions and low unemployment, in order
for him to win re-election in 1972. Nixon believed that wage and price controls were the
most efficient way to fight inflation, while allowing Bums to use expansionary monetary
policy.
Once in office, Bums started to witness the highest global inflation the modem
world had witnessed, and attempted to turn his attention to fighting inflation, but
succumbed to fulfilling the needs of Congress. Paul McCracken, then a Member of the
President’s Council of Economic Advisors told Bums in a conversation, “That President
Nixon is opposed to an income policy and is upset with your advocacy of it would be
irrelevant, because the alternatives to an income policy are things that the President
would dislike even more” (DeLong). Bums believed that an income policy would fight
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inflation more efficiently than controls or contractionary monetary policy which would
inevitably allow the unemployment rate to creep up to 6%, a situation that the people of
the United States would certainly not tolerate. A rising unemployment rate was not only
something that the people would not tolerate, but something that Nixon wouldn’t allow.
The fact the Bums supported an income policy also meant that he and his Board of
Governors believed that it should not be the Fed’s responsibility alone to fight inflation.
Income policies can take the form of “voluntary” wage and price guidelines to
extreme cases of actual price freezes, which usually occur in times of war due to high
inflation pressures and a shortage in the labor supply. This then results in firms having to
pay more for labor, as the labor supply curve shifts right. An income policy, mandated by
a bureaucratic institution1, creates wage ceilings for employers to cap salaries in order to
combat inflation, but with some serious side effects. Many economists agree that these
policies successfully fight inflation, but at the same time, the policies can distort price
signals sent to firms, which can eventually lead a decrease in quality of goods produced
or the actual quantity of output. Further, any form of policy that engages the government
leads to higher compliance costs for the corporation, and another barrier in reaching
economic efficiency.
On August 15th, 1971, President Nixon imposed the first peacetime wage freeze in
United States history to combat the 6% inflation the nation experienced in 19702. The
policy consisted of four phases, which were subsequently ended in 1974 due to the

1 These include institutions such as the Office o f Price Stabilization created by President Nixon in 1971 or
the Office o f Price Administration by President Roosevelt in 1941.
2 August 15th, 1971 was also the day that President Nixon abandoned the Bretton Woods System that linked
the dollar to the price of gold, which would lead to an inflationaiy impulse, while boosting exports, and
thus GDP.

Barsema 4

inability of controlling inflation, while at the same time dampening output creating a time
of stagflation. With this, the controls were primarily aimed at large corporations that
contained labor unions, due to the relative ease of negotiating wage contracts with union
heavy industries as opposed to industries which are not
The wage-freezes were not supported by Bums alone. Many politicians on both
sides jumped aboard the policy as early as 1969-1970. These included Senator Barry
Goldwater (R-AZ) and Congressman Henry Reuss (D-WI) saying, “We should now have
learned that tight money and tight fisicality alone are not enough.” Even former Fed
Chief William Martin who notoriously opposed controls stated “under present
circumstances, fiscal and monetary policy isn’t enough to fight inflation” (Nelson 14).
However, Bums abandonment of monetarist theories with the acceptance of cost-push
inflation into the economy by late 1970 took many economists by surprise, especially
Milton Friedman who often stated his disagreement with the Fed Chair publicly.
By 1971, The Nixon Administration was openly against any form of income
policy, but soon adopted wage-price freezes due to political pressure to ease inflation.
Indeed, inflation without the controls was falling from about 6.6% in 1970, to about 5%
in 1971, however the rise in the output gap is what was concerning Capitol Hill34. It is true
that inflation was still well above the target level of 2%, but Bums was facing a
commodity impact of a sharp increase in the price of gasoline and cmde oil, as well as a
dry spell in agricultural commodities, coupled with the continued expectation of rising
inflation, something that the Phillips Curve in its previous state could not predict.

3 Cost-push inflation can be defined as inflation caused by a continually decreasing short-run aggregate
supply curve, leading to reduced output and higher prices (Miller 259).
4 In 1971, GDP was roughly at 3%, however the output gap was estimated to be at 6% (Nelson 18).
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The supply shocks emphasized the validity of the cost-push theory, and the
impending movement of upward prices went against the classic monetarist theory. Hobart
Rowan of the Washington Post noted, “Higher gasoline, fuel oil and electricity prices will
have a ‘cost-push’ effect, making other products more expensive” (WP, 11/08/73). The
monetarists believed that price shocks would lead to the prices of “core” items to fall,
theorizing that higher oil leads to lower profits, which in result lead to lower wages. In
fact, the opposite was true as the higher prices were set into workers’ wage contracts,
thus a lag in wage policy would lead to “catch-up” wage contracts, spiraling inflation
ever higher. Federal Reserve Governor Andrew Bimmer argued that if the Fed would
increase the growth of the money supply, the increase in aggregate demand would drive
down both wages and inflation, but the accommodations would not be seen until 1975
(Nelson 19).
It was not until 1974 when President Ford’s Administration, and the admittance of
Alan Greenspan onto the Council of Economic Advisors, that the monetarists regained
control of economic policy. In a speech to Congress, Ford stated: “the real weapons
against inflation are the old-time virtues—a sound budget and a sound monetary policy”.
Given in a speech to the House of Representatives in 1974, Bums retracted his belief in
controls, and suggested that the only way to moderate inflation was through the control of
the deficit, but yet the control of interest rates would not have any long-term effect for the
fight on inflation. Nonetheless, confidence in monetary policy was still low at the
beginning of the year, as Leontief said, “The long-standing claim of economists that they
know how to control inflation is an empty premise” (Nelson 20).
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With the help of several outside economists and the people of the United States,
the Ford Administration created the WIN (Whip Inflation Now) program, which was a
series of coupons that were signed to promote wage increases, and was then coupled with
a tax-cut in order to boost aggregate demand and combat cost-push inflation. This type of
policy was first implemented in Britain in 1973, and appeared to be very beneficial.
Indeed, inflation retracted in 1974 and mid-1975, due to large amounts of unemployment
and lower commodity prices, but then trended back upwards in fear of further commodity
spikes once again.
The second cause for prolonged inflation during the late-1970’s was trade-union
contracts, which led to industries such as the steel and automobile industries to raise
prices on weakening demand, seeming to skew the fundamental laws of supply and
demand. This clearly shows how important expected inflation is on the actual inflation
rate, as just the proposal of an oil price tax, rekindled thoughts that there must be inflation
in commodity prices, leading to higher inflation for the remainder of the decade.
In 1977, the Carter Administration entered into office, and Carter argued that the
major cause of inflation was the declining dollar which could inevitable lead to serious
consequences, such as the re-pricing of oil into another form of currency, and away from
the dollar. With this, as the Carter Administration entered into office, so did the new
Chairman of the Federal Reserve, G. William Miller, serving the shortest term in Federal
Reserve history5.
Although many people do not recall the term of Miller, he was the first Chairman
to recognize the dramatic impact that the declining dollar was having on the U.S.
5 Miller’s term lasted only from March 8,1978 to August 6,1979. In 1979, Miller willingly resigned from
his post, and replaced Michael Blumenthal as the Secretary o f the U.S. Treasury. He was subsequently
replaced by Paul Volcker.
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economy, and started raising the Federal Funds Rate (FFR) to curb depreciation and thus
W<^
inflation. Iqalso during Miller’s tenure that both Carter and Miller said that recession
“should be risked as part of the fight against inflation,” changing their opinions from
earlier beliefs. The rise to double-digit interest rates that occurred in 1978-1979, are
commonly mistaken as the action of Paul Volcker, but for the first time during the
decade, the FFR stood above both the anticipated rate of inflation and headline CPI.
1978 was a break-through year for monetary policy, but still, both Miller and the
Carter Administration, believed that wage-price controls and oil taxes should be coupled
with the rising interest rates, a theme that was prominent in the early 1970’s, but failed.
Interest rates were rising, but seemed to have no real impact on inflation. Even prominent
economists such as James Tobin, published articles titled, “Why the Fed’s Cure Won’t
Work,” citing that if 8% unemployment will lead to a decline in inflation by four points,
“we will be lucky.” Other economists shared this view, arguing that inflation was
interest-rate proof, and America was interest rate prone.
As Paul Volcker came in to office in 1979, inflation was at an astounding rate,
while unemployment was high. It is true that the interest rate cuts of 1978 were slightly
effective, but they were not enough. Volcker and the Federal Reserve decided to
deemphasize the FFR as a target by widening its range by more than 5 times Miller’s
previous range. This subsequently led to huge fluctuations in the FFR, while the Fed
focused its attention non-borrowed reserves, which the Fed would set after it determined
the demand at the discount window. Curiously, this led to a greater lack of control of
monetary policy as the money supply growth increased instead of decreasing. The new
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policy of focusing on money aggregates and less on the interest rate target proved to be a
smoke-screen that allowed Volcker to focus on driving up the interest rate6.
In March 1980, the Fed raised interest rates to 15% to “break the back of
inflation,” causing the U.S. economy to fall into recession, in which Volcker then started
to ease, allowing interest rates to fall sharply. By 1981, inflation came back, rising to
over 10%, in which Volcker shot up the interest rate again to 15%, causing the U.S.
economy to once again fall into recession, but for this time, the country would be in it for
two years. This extreme action seemed to be the answer, because as interest rates rose,
the growth of the money supply fell, and reduced expected inflation by reducing actual
inflation (Mishkin 425).
In the end, it is important to realize that inflation targeting was not formally
introduced into the United States as a policy until the early 1990’s under the stewardship
of Alan Greenspan. The countries that took the first steps include New Zealand, Canada,
and the United Kingdom after failing to control inflation while targeting monetary
aggregates, which will be discussed further on in the paper. The 1970’s had a tremendous
impact on the global economy, and left inflation in the global structure until about 1990,
in which a new financial crisis came about. It is important to understand the history of
inflation to understand the actual framework, but one can see that one particular policy
does not work in every circumstance. It takes the right tools as the right time to
successfully control monetary policy. In the following sections, I will focus my attention
solely on inflation targeting, and the costs and benefits of using the framework.

6 Volcker targeted money growth to basically control the short-term interest rate.
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Inflation Targeting as a Framework:
Inflation targeting is known as a monetary policy that explicitly targets a
country’s rate of inflation by “the announcement of official target ranges for the inflation
rate at one or more horizons, and by the explicit acknowledgement that low and stable
inflation is the overriding goal of monetary policy” (Bemanke/Mishkin 97). Inflation
targeting involves several elements such as the public announcement of medium-term
targets, an institutional commitment to price stability as the primary, long-run goal, an
information-inclusive strategy which many aggregates are examined, increased
transparency with the public and Capitol Hill, and increased accountability of the Fed
(Mishkin 501).
Inflation targeting has been mandated by many foreign institutions such as
Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, but legislation for the policy has also
been adopted here in the United States. Former Senator Connie Mack III (R-FL)
introduced a bill in 1995 that would establish price stability as the primary goal of
monetary policy, and had been vocally supported by many economic pundits such as Fed
Reserve Chairman Ben Bemanke. Unlike the foreign nations mentioned above, the
United States used the policy as a framework, rather than a rule, in the attempt to achieve
long-run economic growth that is sustainable.
Inflation targets always occur as an announcement of an actual range, rather than
single numbers, as was attempted in the 1970’s, in which today’s target is 1-2% inflation.
This is thought of to be the most economically efficient range, due to the fact that an
inflation rate of 0 is almost impossible to achieve while maintaining growth within the
economy. Also, 0% inflation means that it is harder for firms to cut wages when reducing
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costs. If you keep inflation moderate, real wages drop without firms having to actually
cut nominal wages due to inflation erosion on real wages. With this, the initial
announcement of the range generally allows for gradual transition from the current rate of
inflation to the target steady-state level deemed consistent with price stability. This
transition usually allows anywhere from two to four years, with a time horizon for the
actual target to last anywhere from one year to an ongoing target. In practice, central
banks tend to rather overcompensate for misses, particularly in the short-run, as to not
overshoot and send the economy into recession (Bemanke/Mishkin 99).
Accompanied with the announcement of the targets, there is a statement that
accompanies the announcement that controlling inflation is the primary goal, and that the
central bank will be held accountable for meeting those targets. New Zealand, for
example, implemented the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act of 1989 that inflation
targeting will be not only be the primary goal, but the only goal, with no other mention of
competing goals within the legislature (Bemanke/Mishkin 100). Clearly, this is an
extreme case that most central bankers do not live by, as most central bankers have the
targets embodied within statements rather than formulating it into actual law. The
philosophy of setting medium to long-run horizons for inflation targets is that monetary
policy can only affect real output and production in the short-run.
In regards to accountability, the central banks have varying degrees of
accountability in the framework as well. For example, New Zealand created an incentive
contract for its governors, having one’s tenure being based upon his or her ability to meet
the implied targets. In most countries, no such laws exist, but as Bemanke and Mishkin
point out, missing the targets come with personal costs such as reputational damage or a
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lack of prestige and credibility (100). The accountability is an extremely important issue
when it comes to inflation targets, because the Fed has to remain strong and consistent, as
to focus on Main Street, and not be a servant to Wall Street. Some economists argue that
former Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan became a “slave” to Wall Street by
lowering the FFR down to practically 0% in the wake of the September 11 attacks on the
United States. The easy credit can lead to an increased amount of risk-taking or the
creation of “bubbles” within industries, which is being played out in the current financial
markets, when investors were pricing “junk” bonds near extremely similar to Aaa rated
bonds.
The framework states that controlling inflation remains the primary goal within
this policy, but it is important to note that most central bankers make room for short-run
stabilization effects, much like those of Mr. Greenspan’s, particularly in regards to output
and exchange rates, thus financial stability. These actions are accomplished through
focusing on core-CPI, as to exclude the drag from “supply-shocks,” such as the OPEC
debacle of the 1970’s, or any other volatile agricultural product or commodity. Another
accommodation is the use of ranges, which allow policy makers to maneuver within the
range, while depressing or boosting economic growth. Lastly, many countries, including
the United States, have “escape clauses” which allows an inflation target to be suspended
or modified immediately due to an adverse economic condition .
Another attribute of inflation targeting is the use of forward-looking indicators,
such as the producers price index (PPI), the employment cost index, and prices of basic
materials. Consisting of many different forward-looking prices, these indicators have7
7 An example o f this was the Bundesbank, which in 1979, announced a one-year “unavoidable” inflation
rate o f 4%, and then moved its target gradually lower to 2% over a six-year period due to die oil supply
shocks.
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shown predictive power of inflation in the past, but at times can be hard to gauge. For
example, the central bank of Sweden and Canada created a “monetary conditions index,”
which contains a weighted combination of the exchange rate and short-term interest rates,
coupled with standard indicators such as money and credit aggregates, commodities,
capacity utilization, and wage developments, though most will argue that the MCI is an
over-simplified indicator (Freedman 465). In most countries, however, the central bank
uses detailed industrial and credit reports presented by regional governors and senior loan
officers to provide inflation conditions.
In most inflation targeting countries, the central bankers publish frequent reports
on the state of the economy and on inflation, including current forecasts, and the
necessary policy that will be necessary to keep inflation in line. For example, the Bank of
England publishes a report called the Inflation Report quarterly, which gives a detailed
analysis of what factors are in the economy that are likely to influence inflation and
therefore, policy. New Zealand’s central bank publishes a similar report, but publishes it
every six months. The United States Federal Reserve takes a different approach, where
the Fed governor is required to give a detailed analysis to Congress twice a year, and
meets with the Federal Open Market Committee every six weeks to decide whether or not
to raise the FFR, as well as give a detailed public report on inflation and the economy.
This emphasizes one of the key points of inflation targeting: transparency. The improved
communication that this framework provides is extremely beneficial to the long-run
stability and growth of the global financial markets and economy (Bemanke/Mishkin
102).
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With this, inflation targeting is essentially a move toward greater independence
between the national government and the central bank. In most countries, the central
bank’s decisions are completely of its own, and have no influence from the national
government such as the United States. This is in order to provide not only efficient, but
ethical means of monetary policy within the country. For example, the central
government does not have the means, mind power, or the resources to effectively dictate
monetary policy due to their lack of experience. The central government’s role is to make
rules and regulations for the people, and not to govern economic policy. More
importantly, the federal government might steer away from policies that are good for the
long-run economy, and toward policies could hurt the economy in the short-run in fear of
a decrease in popularity or if it is an election year. This is not true for all countries,
however, such as the United Kingdom where the Bank of England requires the
Chancellor of Exchequer to ultimately dictate monetary policy, no matter what
conclusion the Governor has reached.
In addition, the first implementation of the framework occurred internationally
during the collapse of the exchange rate peg that led to monetary authorities to search for
an alternative “nominal anchor” for monetary policy. In other cases, such as Canada,
countries came about to inflation targeting because of the failed attempts of implementing
money-targeting approaches. In other cases, such as the United States, countries adopted
inflation targets after successfully reducing inflation through interest rate hikes, and
wanted to “lock-in” gains (Bemanke 104).
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The Disadvantages of Inflation Targeting:
Critics of inflation targeting usually cite four disadvantages of inflation targeting,
which include delayed signaling, an increase in rigidity, the potential for increased output
fluctuations, and low economic growth. These critics usually stem from the belief that
inflation targeting is not being used as a framework, but as a rule, which allows for no
complimentary policy implementation.
First, many critics point out that inflation targeting leads to delayed signals to the
public markets because o f the lag of the economic policy. In contrast to exchange rates
and monetary aggregates, critics argue that inflation is not easily controlled by the
monetary authorities because of the long lags in the effects of monetary policy, which
o

lead to delayed outcomes in policy, via its effect on the short real interest rate . This leads
to inflation targets sending inaccurate signals to both the public and private markets about
the position of monetary policy. The delayed signals can also lead to inadvertent
consequences by the time the interest rate cut or hike takes place.
A second criticism of the policy is the excess rigidity on monetary policymakers,
limiting their discretion to respond to unforeseen events such as supply-shocks. In fear of
losing credibility, policymakers might be forced to make moves that could severely
impact the economy, or not be able to accommodate a supply-shock that could potentially
send the economy into recession. In reality, this criticism does not hold very credible, due
to the fact that every country uses escape clauses for this exact reason. Secondly, inflation
targeting implements ranges of long-run acceptable inflation, which allows policy makers
to have room to maneuver in case of an unforeseen event.8

8 The lag in the monetary policy usually takes three to four quarters to take effect, thus having potentially
dangerous consequences.
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Probably the most important critique of inflation targeting is that the sole focus on
inflation may lead to monetary policy that is too tight when inflation is above the target
range, which could increase output fluctuations. Frequent output fluctuations can lead to
serious economic consequences, as businesses will have a difficult time gauging how
much to produce, which could lead to output shortages (which leads to higher prices, thus
inflation), or it could lead to a surplus in inventories, in which many laborers could be
terminated, creating a multiplier effect. This again, is a weak argument towards inflation
targeting, because all of the central banks who target inflation have set their range above
0%, which implies a concern for output, employment, and the ability to accommodate
short run stabilization measures. The central bankers set a range instead of a constant
number, allowing the central bank leeway for expansionary policy in downturns.
Lastly, another common concern about the framework is that it will lead to slower
growth and unemployment. This too, leads to an inadequate conclusion because research
has shown that once the desired level of inflation is achieved, output and employment
returned to levels that were higher than they originally were. This can be seen in
countries like New Zealand, which has seen tremendous growth after their desired level
of inflation had been achieved in 1992 (Mishkin 503).
Advantages of Inflation Targets:
There are many advantages to inflation targets when comparing them to other
monetary policies such as exchange-rate and monetary aggregate targeting, as long as a
central bank keeps inflation targeting as framework, and not as a rule. These advantages
include quicker response times to unforeseen events, greater transparency, increases in
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accountability of the central bank, as well as acting as the most efficient method of long
term growth.
First, inflation targeting, much like monetary targeting, allows the policy makers
to focus on domestic considerations and to respond to supply shocks with ease. Due to
the inherent nature of the policy, the targets allow the central bank to move within the
targets to face the underlying conditions of the economy, while sill allowing the central
bank to focus on other variables such as output and employment. Controlling the money
supply allows you to do this as well, but also requires a lot more maintenance, while at
the same time showing inconsistent results, such as the situation in 1980 under Volcker
when he lowered the money supply, but inflation kept rising. Shifts in money demand,
and in turn velocity, can effect short-run output as seen in the IS/LM model, leading to
another drawback of targeting monetary growth. This leads to Lars Svensson’s
conclusion that intermediate inflation targets could help control money velocity, as is the
case for the United Kingdom, which has a history of unstable velocity (Svensson, 2000)
This leads to the second advantage of targeting the inflation rate, which is an
increase in credibility in the Fed. Many economists overlook the importance of this
quality, but I believe that it is one o f the most important. First, accountability leads to
greater independence of the central banks which is essential in maintaining a small
output-gap. Governments will allow central banks greater independence if the central
bank is credible and accountable. In many cases, bureaucracy just puts one more hurdle
in the way of economic efficiency, and data has proven that independence of central
banks, has led to a tremendous boost in output, such as Canada for example. Secondly,
increased accountability also leads to decreased expected inflation, a phenomenon that
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plagued the early 1970’s. If inflation does creep up, a credible central bank will lead
people to believe that the inflation will be quickly contained, and thus unnecessary for
businesses to increase prices. Also, if workers have a better view about inflation, the
wage-setting process becomes more efficient, giving workers a clearer expectation of real
disposable income.
Another advantage of the framework is an increase in transparency, which
ultimately leads to greater credibility. Greater transparency with the public and Wall
Street leads to greater overall output within the economy as businesses worry less on
what future interest rates, inflation rates, and exchange rates, and focus more on
increasing efficiency and output because steady inflation rates usually lead to steady
interest rates. In turn, this leads to greater profitability within the firms, which means
higher returns on equity (stock prices go up), making consumers wealthier. While this
would tend to lead to inflation, the rise in output would negate most of the inflation in the
system, while the monetary policy tools would couple that effect. Also greater
transparency makes the central bank’s actions more sensitive the bank’s actions, and
“increases the cost of deviation from the announced policy” (Svensson, 2000). As
discussed earlier, transparency comes mandatory in some countries, and moderately
voluntary in others, but nonetheless, inflation targeting does promote increased output in
the long-run, making people wealthier.
With this, inflation targeting is superior to the other forms of monetary policy
because its ability to control the real exchange rate within an open economy. Svensson
argues that real exchange rates will affect the relative price between domestic and foreign
goods, which will affect the both foreign and domestic demand for domestic goods.
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Exchange rates also affect domestic currency prices, which then affect the price of
imported goods, which directly raises CPI inflation with a much shorter lag. Finally, a
fluctuating exchange rate affects imported inputs into final products, thus driving up the
marginal cost of production, which could lead to a substitution effect within the labor
force, leading to many layoffs9. Nevertheless, inflation targeting can directly control
exchange rate fluctuations without the adverse consequences that would be seen if a
money-supply framework existed (158)10.
Lastly, due to the fact that inflation targeting creates greater accountability, it also
creates greater responsibility by policy makers, so as to not fall into the time-consistency
trap, where the attempt to expand output and employment creates overly expansionary
monetary policy. The inflation range would have to be recognized and maintained, thus
almost creating a ceiling on how much economic growth can take place. The timeconsistency problem can be defined as monetary policy conducted on a discretionary dayto-day basis leads to poor long-run outcomes. This problem arises on the belief that
people’s expectations are assumed to be unchanged, so policymakers attempt to boost
output (or lower unemployment) by using great discretionary monetary policy than
expected. Since firms determine wages and prices that reflect expectations about policy,
firms and workers will raise their expectations not only on inflation, but on wages and
prices. Under this discretionary policy, output tends to stay constant, while inflation rises,

9 Layoffs could be the result o f two different consequences or a combination o f both. First, higher input
prices leads to higher production costs, thus leaving the manufacturer in a position to cut jobs to save on
costs. Secondly, higher input prices means higher final goods prices, which would have to be compensated
through higher wages, thus leading to a substitution effect once again.
10 It is important to note that inflation can be imported through foreign supply or demand shocks, which
raises the level o f inflation domestically and lowers domestic demand. This is another argument for using
inflation-targets.
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creating negative externalities (pecuniary and non-pecuniary) on the economy (Mishkin
488).
A key advantage to accountability and thus inflation targeting, is that it can help
focus the political debate on what a central bank can do in the long-run, rather than what
it cannot do. Thus, inflation targeting relieves political pressures on the central bank to
pursue inflationary monetary policy and thereby reduces the likelihood of time-consistent
policymaking.
Conclusion:
In conclusion, inflation targeting is the most efficient method of monetary policy
that the Federal Reserve has its disposal. Inflation targeting allows the Federal Reserve to
be both pro-active and re-active during times of economic turmoil and uncertain times. It
is especially useful at times like the present when the entire FOMC has declared that not
only is their outlook on the economy dire, but hard to forecast. This framework has
allowed the Federal Reserve to accurately maneuver the credit market turmoil through
rate cuts, while still keeping inflation within their range11. The Fed has cut 75 basis
points, or 0.75% off the Federal Funds Rate, as well as slashing the rate at which
companies can borrow from the discount window, while keeping inflation within its
bounds, thus bailing the economy out of potential recession, while keeping inflation tight.
Throughout the paper, I have discussed the cost/benefit analysis of the use of
inflation targeting. It is important to note that I, nor does the Federal Reserve, support
using any policy as a rule, but rather as a framework. When used as a framework,

11 This can be shown through the November core PCE data, an important inflation gauge for the Fed, where
the year-over-year growth is 1.8%, within the Fed’s target o f 1-2%. Further, unemployment is still at 4.7%,
which is relatively low, which means that the low inflation/low unemployment environment somewhat
contradicts the fundamental view o f the Phillips Curve.
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inflation targeting allows the Federal Reserve to be more transparent with Wall Street,
Main Street, as well as foreign central banks. Transparency, as we have seen through the
credit crisis, is the most important weapon a company or central bank can have at its
disposal.
As I have discussed, there are many other advantages to inflation targeting such as
quicker response times to unforeseen events, greater accountability for policy makers,
and allowing the central bankers not to be continually questioned by Capitol Hill. It is
even more important to address the rebuttals against the framework. I have shown that
most of the rebuttals are not valid, as they typically refer to inflation-targeting as a rule,
and not a framework. The fact is that the framework does not cause more rigidity within
monetary policy, but less, as it is the purpose of creating a range to do so, and that
transparency through frequent updates, speeches, and publications takes the lag-time of
implementing the policy out of the economic outcomes.
In the end, I believe that creating inflation targets has benefited many nations
besides the United States, and helps establish precedent for incoming officials. One of the
hardest inflation obstacles to over come is expected inflation, thus the use of inflation
targets extinguishes lofty expectations, and keeps prices, wages, and output at a
controlled, but sustainable pace. Although inflation-targeting has been used for over
twenty-years now, there has not been much published on the subject from economists
outside of Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bemanke, and New York’s Federal Reserve
Governor Fred Mishkin. As the policy progresses, it would not be surprising to see more
light brought onto the subject after seeing the great success that the framework has had in
countries such as England, New Zealand, and Canada.
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Appendix:

Figure 1: A history of inflation

Figure 2: Inflation rising faster than wages in the 1970’s
G D P D e fla to r a n d N o n fa m n W a g e In fla tio n , 1 9501 994
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Figure 3: Global inflation elevated in the 1970’s

Figure 4: Inflation Expectations vs. Actual Inflation
Actual GDP Deflator Inflation, and Previous
Year's Forecast

Figure 5: The short-run effect of stable aggregate supply and a decrease in aggregate demand
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Figure 6: Decrease in Aggregate Supply leads to inflation

($ trillions)

Figure 7: Cost-push inflation with an Activist Policy to promote high employment

Figure 8: History of the Federal Funds Rate
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Figure 9: Unemployment remains elevated throughout the 70’s
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Figure 10: Unemployment has positive correlation with oil prices
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Figure 11: Supply Shocks lead to lower output and higher inflation
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Figure 12: Money growth vs. inflation
Inflation Rate,
Money Growth
Rate (%)

16 r14 -

Money Growth (M1)
Two Years Earlier

12

Inflation Rate

10

8
6

4
2

0
-2
-4

1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 19941996 199820002002

Barsema 26

Figure 13: Empirical Evidence of the success of inflation targeting on a global basis
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